loss was moderate or large. These findings suggest that positive affect can promote an overt shift from a deciTwo experiments examined the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and choice. Partici-sion rule focusing primarily on probabilities to one focusing on utilities or outcome values, especially for pants in whom positive affect had been induced, as well as no-manipulation controls, were asked to make losses. Taken together, the results are compatible with an interpretation of the influence of positive affect in both numerical evaluations of verbal probabilities in three-outcome gambles and actual betting decisions terms of an elaboration of positive cognitive material, and purposive behavior in decisions, rather than in about similar gambles. Results from Experiment 1 showed the phenomenon labeled cautious optimism: terms of mere response bias. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc. Positive affect participants significantly overestimated the probabilities associated with phrases for winning relative to their estimates of probability of Recent work has suggested that positive affect has a losing for the same phrases (optimism), while partici-complex influence on risk preferences and decisions in pants in a control condition did not; yet, in actual gam-risky situations. For example, people in a positive state bling situations, affect condition participants were have been found to make significant overestimations much less likely to gamble than were controls when a of the likelihood of positive events and underestimareal loss was possible (caution). Results of the betting tions of negative events (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; task from Experiment 2 further indicated that affect Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Wright & participants used a betting-decision rule that was dif-Bower, 1992). However, results from other studies indiferent from that of controls: They bet less than controls cate that, despite perhaps being relatively more optiin gambles where potential losses were large, even mistic, people in whom positive affect has been induced though probability of loss was small, and they bet more also tend to be conservative or self-protective in choice than controls in gambles where the amount of the potential loss was small, even though the probability of situations where there is a focus on loss or where there is a reasonable chance that a meaningful, real loss may occur
choice behavior under conditions of risk or uncertainty of two conditions, Positive Affect (n Å 51) or No Affect (n Å 58). may still reflect risk-aversion and/or loss-aversion. This, we propose, is due to an increased emphasis on Procedure. Participants were first seated in indilosses in the actual choice process, because of even vidual cubicles and were informed that the experiment greater disutilities for losses than would normally oc-consisted of two parts, each lasting about five to ten cur for these negative outcomes among control partici-minutes-a computerized probability-estimation task pants. This reevaluation of losses typically overrides and a betting task. Individuals were required to make any overestimation and underestimation that may be probability estimates for 12 different three-outcome applied to the initial anchor probabilities of good and gambles with commonly used probability phrases and bad outcomes, respectively.
to make actual gambling decisions about a comparable Experiment 1 was designed to test this hypothesis set of 11 three-outcome gambles where probabilities that the cautious optimism phenomenon we have just were stated as decimal values and explicitly illustrated described could be demonstrated and explained by af-in a bar graph. fect induction by independently examining the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and Affect manipulation. Affect was induced in this betting behavior within the same individuals. We de-study by presenting one group of participants with a signed a betting task where real loss was possible and bag of candy at the time that each was seated in the where probabilities were both numerically stated and booth with the computer terminal. Participants were explicitly graphed. 1 We hypothesized that in our bet-told that the gift was ''just a small token of appreciation ting task positive affect would induce cautious behavior for your willingness to volunteer for this study.'' The resulting in greater risk-aversion and/or loss-aversion receipt of such a gift has been used in a number of in our experimental-subject group relative to that affect studies and has been shown through different shown by control-group participants by generally en-manipulation checks to be a successful positive-affect hancing their disutilities for what they would judge as inducer (c.f., Isen & Patrick, 1983; Arkes et al., 1988) . losses relative to their reference point. We also de-Because affect induction of this type is known to be signed a separate probability-estimation task for com-temporary (usually lasting about one-half hour), the parable gambles, but one in which the probabilities two tasks were, as a precaution, counterbalanced so were stated as linguistic phrases, and where an overt that approximately one-half of the participants in each gambling choice was not explicitly solicited. These group did either the betting task or the estimation task gambles were used to test our prediction that the posi-first. This allowed us to examine whether the task pretive-affect participants would, at the same time they sented second, regardless of which type, was less influexhibited caution in their bets, exhibit the hypothe-enced by the affect manipulation than when it was presized greater optimism relative to control participants sented immediately after the gift presentation. in their explicit probability estimates for these gamBetting task. In the betting task each participant bles' linguistic probabilities of winning and losing.
was presented with a different computer-generated random ordering of 11 three-outcome gambles that had zero EXPERIMENT 1 expected value and for which the ratio of probability of winning to losing (and consequently the reciprocal ratio Method of amount to lose to amount to win) was low (P W /P L Å .20, .30, .40, .50), medium (P W /P L Å .80, 1.00, 1.25), or Subjects. Participants were 109 undergraduates high (P W /P L Å 2.00, 2.50, 3.33, 5.00). Low P W /P L gambles who were fulfilling a requirement for an introductory (''Low'' in Fig. 1 merically, and, thus, no systematic estimation bias (i.e., optimism in our framework) can occur for both affect and control groups. It is (.45), 0 (.10), 04 (.45)].
important to note, however, that this is different from probability In order to make the gambling situations realistic, weighting. In speaking about the explicit numerical probabilities participants were told upon entering the experiment used in their own experiments, Kahneman and Tversky argued that that although they could not gamble for money, the ''the issue of overestimation does not arise in the present [numerical] experimenter had special permission to allow them to context, where the subject is assumed to adopt the stated value of p' ' (p. 281). gamble with something else that was valuable to sions had been made. Thus, participants were not given any feedback as they made their decisions so as to insure that it was not possible for gambling outcomes to produce a possible shift in reference point during the betting task and, hence, confound the affect manipulation. We did not want the gambling results to produce possible positive or negative affect in and of themselves. In addition, because participants did not receive feedback after each trial, it is very unlikely that our arbitrary cutoff value of 40 points and the motivational scheme of awarding an additional credit hour for more than 40 points would have introduced any unnatural discontinuity or change in their utility functions at this value.
Probability estimation task. The second task con-FIG. 1. Plot of the P w /P L ratio against the mean bet value for sisted of presenting participants with a random orderaffect and control subjects. The ordinate scale is equivalent to the ing of 12 three-outcome, zero expected value gambles proportion of points bet relative to the maximum amount allowed of the same form as described earlier, but for which (i.e., three times the value initially stated in the gamble).
the probabilities were actually stated only in terms of commonly used phrases rather than proportions. The 12 gambles were formed from 6 pairs in which the probthem-their credit hour for participating. (In actuality, ability of winning and losing phrases were reversed. the experiment was programmed so as to insure that Four phrases (extremely unlikely, unlikely, somewhat no participant would lose his or her credit.) Partici-unlikely, and worse than even chance) were each associpants were told that they had a stake of 40 points and ated with a winning and a losing outcome three times could play 11 three-outcome gambles in which they (from the set of 10 outcomes {16, {12, {8, {4, or {3). could either win, lose, or break even. If they finished A different probability phrase for each gamble's zero the gambling task with more than their 40 points, they outcome was chosen on the basis of mean probability would ''win'' two credit hours for participating rather estimates (in terms of X chances out of 100) obtained than the customary one. If they finished with between from an earlier pilot study such that the average probaone and 39 points (i.e., if they still had any points left) bilities given to the three phrases summed as closely they would ''break even'' and receive their normal to 100 as possible. An example of one such gamble pair credit hour. If they lost all of their points, however, is: [/8 (Extremely Unlikely), 0 (Likely), 04 (Unlikely)] they would lose their normal credit hour and would and [/4 (Unlikely), 0 (Likely), 08 (Extremely Unhave to participate in an additional experiment for likely)]. To simplify the task, participants were asked their course requirement. At this point, all participants to think of a roulette wheel with 100 slots and to decide were given the opportunity to withdraw from the study how many of the slots would be used to represent each with one credit hour and without any penalty. A total probability phrase in terms of X chances out of 100. of four people chose to do so and were thoroughly debriefed as to the nature of the study. All other partici-Results and Discussion pants were debriefed at the completion of the experiment.
Betting task. The betting data for the 11 numerical gambles were first examined via a 2 1 2 1 (11) ANOVA The individuals' task each time was to decide for each gamble whether to play it as it was presented, to double with two between-subjects factors (Affect vs Control and Order of Tasks) and one within-subjects factor the outcomes, to triple the outcomes, or to not play the gamble at all. Thus, it was actually possible for them (Gambles). Because the gambles had inherently large differences in terms of how much could be bet on each, to participate and still insure that they would keep their one credit hour by simply responding ''0'' (no play) it was possible for participants to bet conservatively on a gamble with a large amount to win (e.g., [/20 (.10 ), each time, but none of our participants either chose or approximated this strategy. We followed the procedure 0 (.40), 04 (.50)]) and to bet aggressively on a gamble with a small amount to win (e.g., [/4 (.50 ), 0 (.40), suggested by Davidson et al. (1956) , and told participants that, because of time constraints, the gambles 020 (.10)]) and still have their mean bet values reflect greater betting for the first gamble. In order to elimiwould actually be played only after all gambling deci-nate this bias and to make comparisons across gambles Arkes et al., 1988) , to be more likely or at least as likely to bet relative to controls on what we labeled the ''Low'' meaningful, the amount bet on each gamble was normalized in the following way: The amount bet by the P W /P L ratio gambles in Fig. 1 that had small amounts to lose relative to gains. For all 11 gambles in Fig. 1 , person (between 0 and 3X points for each gamble) was divided by X for that gamble to obtain a relative mea-the mean bet value was smaller for those in our affect group, suggesting that positive affect influenced utility sure where higher numbers indicated a greater willingness to bet for bigger potential gains and losses. Hence, values more strongly than it did probabilities in the betting task, if probabilities were influenced at all. a mean of 1.0 for any gamble would indicate that, on average, the participants left the outcomes of the gam-Whereas for both groups the amount bet did increase as the P W /P L ratio became more attractive, for affect bles alone, a 2.0 would indicate that on average amounts were doubled, and so on.
participants at least, the loss of any number of points (from as little as 04 in Gamble 1 to 020 in Gamble 11) As expected, effects involving the ordering variable were not significant (p ú .05); for subsequent analyses, still outweighed the P W /P L ratio-even a very attractive 5:1 ratio, enough so that they consistently bet less then, the data were collapsed across this ordering factor. This absence of a main effect or any interaction than did controls on these gambles. Perhaps the threat of losing a credit hour was so strong that there may involving order of the tasks indicated that the affect manipulation was substantial enough that it did not not have been any gambles perceived as ''low risk of loss'' by our affect participants. Losing points that were ''wear off'' after the first short task, and that completion of the first task was sufficiently independent of the tied to a potential loss of a credit hour may have seemed particularly salient to them, regardless of other characsecond task so as not to confound our analyses.
The ANOVA on the betting data indicated a strong teristics of the gambles. group difference with affect participants being less Probability estimation task. Data from the 12 gamwilling to bet across all gambles than were controls bles in the estimation task were first summarized for (X V Aff Å .85, X V Con Å 1.09, F(1, 99) Å 7.26, p õ .01; MSE each individual by obtaining separate averages across Å 2.16). There was also a significant main effect for the three independent estimates given by the particiGambles (F(10, 990) Å 10.10, p õ .001; MSE Å .56), pant to the phrases extremely unlikely, unlikely, somebut no Group 1 Gamble interaction (F(10, 990) õ 1).
2 what unlikely, and worse than even chance when they Figure 1 plots the mean bet value for each of the eleven were associated with winning and with losing. These gambles against the ratio of P W /P L . This figure clearly data were then submitted to an initial 2 1 2 1 (4 1 2) shows that it was the attractiveness of the high P W /P L ANOVA with two between-subjects factors (Affect vs ratios (the ''High'' gambles in Fig. 1 ) that significantly Control Group, and Order of Tasks), and two withinincreased the betting behavior for both groups, and not subjects factors (Phrases, and Win/Lose Context). As high Amt W /Amt L ratios (the ''Low'' gambles in Fig. 1 ).
expected, all effects associated with the Order of Tasks Both groups were consistently more likely to bet on the variable were not significant (p ú .10) and these data gambles with a high P W /P L ratio, even though the ratio were then collapsed in subsequent analyses. of points to win to points to lose (Amt W /Amt L ) in these We hypothesized that the resulting 2 1 (4 1 2) ANgambles was inversely and unattractively much lower.
OVA would yield no overall Group main effect. It did This is reflected also by the finding across participants not (X V Aff Å 24.53, X V Con Å 24.31, F(1, 95) õ 1); but a in both groups that mean-amount-bet values were posisignificant main effect for Win/Lose Context (X V Win Å tively correlated with the P W /P L ratio (and thus nega-25.49, X V Lose Å 23.36, F(1, 95) Å 15.66, p õ .001; MSE tively correlated with the Amt W /Amt L ratio) (r Aff Å 0.88, Å 56.82) and a Group 1 Context interaction (F(1, 95) df Å 9, p õ .01; and r Con Å 0.70, df Å 9, p õ .02).
Å 5.31, p õ .05; MSE Å 56.82) were found. No other We were somewhat surprised that there was no indiinteractions were significant. cation of an interaction in which affect participants
The overall group main effect was not significant bemight be expected, based on previous research (e.g., cause, as expected, the overestimation of probability phrases associated with the positive outcomes by the affect group was offset by their underestimation of the could have changed as well. They did not. Across all the two crossover points in Fig. 2b are much closer, about .27 for winning and .23 for losing. five phrases that were associated with the zero outcome in the gambles, none of the mean differences were sigIt is interesting to note that, as would be anticipated from previous findings showing positive affect to influnificant when compared between the two groups (p ú .10 in each case). This result implies, as Kahneman ence responses to neutral or slightly positive material, but not negative (e.g., Isen et al., 1985; Isen et al., and Tversky (1979) and others have suggested, that zero outcomes in risk situations (i.e., outcomes that 1992), only the crossover point in the winning or positive frame differed between the two groups, not the maintain the status quo) are essentially ignored. Hence, it is not surprising that their corresponding crossover point in the losing frame. Positive affect led to people's estimating the probability of winning deprobabilities should not be influenced by positive affect.
The means in Table 1 show the critical Group 1 Con-scribed by probability phrases as higher in this simple and riskless estimation task. This makes sense, too, in text interaction in detail. For each of the four phrases, positive affect participants exhibited the hypothesized terms of the process that we propose accounts for the effect: That positive affect gives rise to elaboration of optimism phenomenon and the control participants did not. Individuals in our affect condition estimated the positive features or aspects of neutral or positive stimuli and situations, especially in a positive context (see probability value associated with each phrase as being higher when it was associated with the winning context Isen & Shalker, 1982; Isen et al., 1985; Isen et al., 1992) . Positive affect is not known to promote such as opposed to the losing context. Recall that this was the basis for our definition of optimism-the relative elaboration in a negative context and would not be expected to have a similar influence in a negative frame. overestimation within an individual of probabilities of good outcomes or gains to bad outcomes or losses. Fig-It should be noted, too, that this effect occurs on probability phrases which are inherently vague and that ure 2 shows these means graphically and illustrates their differences when compared with mean estimates therefore the estimates of the positive affect participants cannot be considered less realistic than those of obtained from an independent group of 107 participants who had been presented with the same phrases controls, or ''biased'' in the connotative sense of that word. When both measures (betting and probability esin a totally context-free setting and were simply asked to interpret them in terms of X chances out of 100. timation) are considered together, the results confirm that although in a real gambling situation where sig- Figures 2a and 2b show that for both of our groups there appears to be the typical overestimation of low nificant loss is possible, positive affect changes the judged amounts of the utilities of losing relative to that and underestimation of moderate probabilities. However, the over-and underestimation crossover points of winning, in the simple and riskless estimation task it more strongly influences the overestimation of winning for the two groups are quite different. In Fig. 2a the curves indicate that for affect participants when the probabilities, not of losing.
Although these results are encouraging for our cauphrase is placed in a winning context, the probability crossover point (PCP) is about .33; for the losing context tious optimism explanation of affect and decision-making, it could be argued that our use of numerical probait is much lower, about .23. For control participants,
FIG. 2.
Plot of subjective probability functions for winning and losing contexts for both affect and control subjects. Values along X-axis represent probability estimates for each phrase obtained without specific reference to winning, losing, or any other context. bilities in the betting task, but linguistic probabilities Procedure. Each person completed the probability estimation and betting tasks for a new set of 16 threein the estimation task, potentially limits this interpretation. That is, one could offer the argument that our outcome gambles. Because each task was expected to take about twice as long to complete as in Experiment results are due to a differential influence of affect on our participants' interpretations of linguistic and nu-1 (about 20 min for each part) and because induced affect has sometimes been found to be short-lived, demerical probability descriptors. In order to examine this possibility empirically, we conducted a second ex-pending on the means of affect induction used (e.g., Frost & Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983) , the periment in which exactly the same set of gambles, with linguistic probability phrases, was used in both two tasks were again counterbalanced in each condition. This resulted in the formation of four groupsthe probability estimation task and the betting task. Furthermore, the gambles were designed to make a control (Group 1) and affect (Group 2) participants who did the probability estimation task first and control stronger comparison between high P W /P L -low Amt W / Amt L (i.e., favorable probability ratio, but unfavorable (Group 3) and affect (Group 4) participants who did the betting task first. amount ratio) and low P W /P L -high Amt W /Amt L (unfavorable probability ratio, but favorable amount ratio)
The 16 three-outcome gambles with phrases as probabilities were of two types and were constructed in such alternatives. That is, we wanted to test an additional implication of our cautious-optimism explanation: If af-a way that each had an approximately zero expected value. For ''Low'' P W /P L ratio gambles (Nos. 1-8 in Tafect participants are indeed primarily sensitized to the values of potential losses relative to probability ratios, ble 2), the ratios of probabilities were unattractive, ranging from approximately 1 4 to 3 4 , but the ratios of then we ought to be able to create some zero expected value gambles with small enough potential losses such amounts to win and lose were exactly reversed (i.e., that our affect participants would be less cautious and ratios of $ W /$ L ranged from 4 3 to 4 1 ). For ''High'' p-ratio perhaps as risk-seeking, if not more so, than our con-gambles (Nos. 9-16), the actual amounts, probabilities, trols, despite a correspondingly unattractive P W /P L and corresponding ratios were also reversed. In this ratio.
way, the same probability phrases were used as P W values in one set and as P L values in the other set so
EXPERIMENT 2
that we could test for differential evaluation. In addition, any significant differences between bets made on Method high and low P W /P L ratio gambles could lead us to determine whether people's betting was the result of focusSubjects. One hundred sixty-eight undergraduate ing on attractive probability ratios or attractive outstudents enrolled in an introductory psychology course come ratios in making their bets. participated in the study for course credit. They were placed in either a Positive Affect (n Å 84) or a Control Affect manipulation. In order to induce affect, an unexpected gift of one high-quality Maxell audiocas-(n Å 84) condition. Note. Probability phrases, abbreviations, and nominal values based on median estimates obtained from two pilot studies with n Å 111 and n Å 268, respectively, are: ANC-Almost no chance (.10); EU-Extremely unlikely (. sette tape was given to each participant in the affect min) was too long for the positive affect induction to have the same impact on the delayed second task as it conditions. The tapes were distributed after an introduction of the study was given and consent to partici-did on the first. Initial ANOVAs that included the task order as a between-subjects factor revealed a similar pate was obtained, and immediately prior to their beginning the first task. In addition, individuals in all pattern of interaction between task order and affect condition, which indicated that the induced affect maconditions were instructed that they would be gambling for ''dollar-points'' to win prizes. They were in-nipulation may have worn off somewhat over time. Large systematic differences (described below) were obstructed that they had the opportunity to win Maxell audiocassette tapes at the end of the experiment by tained on the betting measure between control and affect groups when betting immediately followed affect being in the top 10% of the highest dollar-point winners in the gambling task. It was emphasized to participants induction (Groups 3 and 4), but, unlike in the much shorter Experiment 1, no differences were found bethat this payoff scheme did not force them to reach a certain level of accumulated dollar-points, only that tween the control and affect conditions when betting was delayed about 30 min by doing the probability evalthey needed to do well relative to others. These instructions were given to suggest indirectly, and not specifi-uation task first (p ú .05 for all comparisons of Groups 1 and 2). Furthermore, neither Groups 1 nor 2 differed cally, to students that they need not choose a strategy of betting the maximum on every gamble just to have significantly from the other control group (Group 3), which did do the betting task first (p ú .05). These a chance to win prizes.
results suggest that although the order of presentation Estimation and betting tasks. The computerized of the tasks, in and of itself, had no influence on the probability estimation and betting tasks were pre-participants' judgments, the time delay associated with sented in the same manner as in Experiment 1, using the ordering was sufficient for the induced affect mathe new gambles listed in Table 2 . As before, feedback nipulation to wear off appreciably. Thus, the remaining was given only at the end of the experiment when parti-discussion of the results for the betting task will focus cipants were allowed to play the gambles they had pre-on analyses between Groups 3 and 4, the control partiviously bet on and were debriefed. Following comple-cipants and their affect counterparts who bet immedition of the entire data collection, 17 winning partici-ately after affect induction. However, for completepants were notified that they had won one, two, or three ness, means are presented for all groups in Tables 3  audiocassette tapes. and 4.
Results and Discussion
Betting task. We first examined the betting behavior of each treatment group to see if our Experiment It is first worth noting that the total time necessary for most people to complete all of the tasks (40 to 60 1 findings could be replicated. The results in Table 3 substantiate those of Experiment 1 but also provide nificantly more on gambles where the $ W /$ L ratio was high and the P W /P L ratio was low (X V Con Å 1.11 and X V Aff some further insight. As in Experiment 1, because the possible range of the total amount bet by an individual Å 1.46, F(1, 82) Å 6.35, p õ .025), and less on gambles where P W /P L was high but $ W /$ L was low (X V Con Å 1.54 differed for high and low P W /P L ratio gambles (from 0 to 2100 or 0 to 930, respectively), the mean number of and X V Aff Å 1.25, F(1, 82) Å 4.61, p õ .05).
These results suggest that the effect of positive mood dollar-points bet by each participant for each gamble was first normalized as in Experiment 1 by dividing by is to shift the focus of these individuals from probabilities to gains and losses. In fact, positive affect partici-X, the nominal gamble amount, producing a relative amount bet that could be compared across gambles.
pants seem to avoid gambles with potentially large losses regardless of the favorability of probabilities. In As predicted, the overall Affect vs Control group's main effect and the Gamble Type main effect were not congruence with previous studies (e.g., Isen & Patrick, 1983) , then, our results showed that positive affect parsignificant (p ú .20), but the interaction of these two factors was (F(1, 82) Å 14.49, p õ .001). Controls ticipants did bet less than controls, but they only did so in high potential loss gambles, where the amount to (Group 3 in Table 3 ) had a strong preference for betting on the ''High'' P-ratio gambles with P W /P L ú 1 and $ W / lose was large relative to gains ($ W /$ L õ 1), even though the P W /P L ratio was quite favorable. They actually bet $ L õ 1, more so than on the reverse gambles with P W / P L õ 1 (X V High Å 1.54, X V Low Å 1.11, F(1, 82) Å 13.25, p more than controls on the low P W /P L ratio gambles where the potential losses were small relative to gains õ .001). Because these gambles were constructed to have approximate zero-expected values with probabil-($ W /$ L ú 1). ity ratios and amount ratios that were exactly inverted, Probability estimation judgments. As outlined earthe preference shown by controls for high P W /P L ratio lier and illustrated in Table 2 , the same probability gambles implies that these individuals emphasized atphrases that were used as winning probabilities in the tractive probability ratios in making their bets rather low P W /P L ratio gambles were used as losing probabilithan attractive amount ratios. Affect participants ties in the high P W /P L gambles. These phrases repre-(Group 4) did not show this type of strong preference.
sented small probabilities, ranging from almost no In fact, for them, the difference in mean amount bet chance to somewhat unlikely. Correspondingly, a differwas in the opposite direction with preference for the ent set of phrases were used as the losing probabilities P W /P L õ 1, $ W /$ L ú 1 ratio gambles, although the differin the low P W /P L ratio gambles and as the winning ence was not as pronounced (X V High Å 1.25, X V Low Å 1.46, probabilities in the high P W /P L ratio gambles. These F(1, 82) Å 3.04, p õ .10). When Groups 3 and 4 were compared with each other, affect participants bet sig-phrases were associated with more moderate probabili- Note. Low Probability Phrases and the number of occurrences of each are: Almost no chance (1), Extremely unlikely (3), Uncertain (1), Unlikely (2), Somewhat unlikely (1). High Probability Phrases are: Improbable (1), Unlikely (1), Somewhat unlikely (2), Questionable (1), Worse than even chance (3). Significance levels are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test.
ties (improbable to worse than even chance). If ''opti-tive to losing were significantly more optimistic than were those of controls. These results support Hogarth mism'' of the same magnitude as found in Experiment 1 were to be found in these affect participants' esti-and Einhorn's (1990) notion of dual probability functions whereby individuals typically judge and/or weight mates of the probability phrases, the median judgvague or imprecise negative probabilities more for ments across phrases should have been higher for P W losses than for gains, but this bias is significantly rethan for P L in the gambles presented in Table 4 . This duced by the greater optimism shown by our affect parwas not found. Wilcoxon signed rank tests of median ticipants. differences for P W and P L in Table 4 showed that control Table 5 presents the median phrase estimates for low participants in particular tended to naturally bias their and high P-ratio gambles in a way that more readily probability judgments by inflating the likelihood judgsuggests the strong switch in betting decision rules ment for the same phrase when it was associated with that resulted between these control and affect particilosing relative to when it was associated with winning. 3 pants. The median probability judgments for all conThis biasing effect was strongest for the low probability trols suggests why they preferred the high P W /P L , low phrases, but was found for the phrases denoting larger $ W /$ L ratio gambles: their judgments of the high Pprobabilities as well. However, affect participants did ratios (Med P(W) Å 30.94 and Med P(L) Å 27.19) were much not show this effect, suggesting that although they did better than those which they perceived for the low P W / not exhibit the same absolute optimism found in Exper-P L gambles (Med P(W) Å 21.87 and Med P(L) Å 33.75). For iment 1, their judgments of winning probabilities relaaffect participants, however, a dramatically different inference arises. Despite what would seem to be a very 3 Because the distributions of estimates across conditions were unattractive P W /P L ratio (Med P(W) Å 21.87 and Med P (L) found to be quite skewed for many of these extreme probability Å 33.75) that they estimated from the phrases for the phrases, tests of median differences based on the Wilcoxon signed rank procedure were done rather than standard t-tests of means.
low P W /P L ratio gambles with high $ W /$ L (X V $(W) Å $88 
Control and Affect Median Probability of Winning and Losing Judgments for Low and High P-Ratio Gambles
Low P-ratio gambles High P-ratio gambles and X V $(L) Å $39), affect participants still found these although likelihood of losing is not decreased correspondingly by affect. Any SEU-type model that does not gambles more attractive and bet more on them than they did on the high P-ratio gambles-even though, allow for the possibility that the process of combining likelihoods and utilities or values may be altered by unlike controls, they actually showed optimism by perceiving the actual P W /P L ratio for the high P-ratio gam-affect would have difficulty explaining this phenomenon and also difficulty explaining why affect particibles to be significantly in their favor (Med P(W) Å 32.50 and Med P(L) Å 23.75). Clearly, then, for control partici-pants in our second experiment should actually become more risk-averse as the ratio of the probability estipants betting behavior is consistent with the likelihood estimates they gave to the phrases and hence reflects mates of winning to losing become increasingly more attractive. a likelihood-based betting rule; but for positive affect participants, increased betting behavior was not con-A more plausible model is one that suggests that a clear distinction be made between the initial estimasistent with perceived increases in P W /P L ratios, but tion process for probabilities and the evaluation and rather was influenced more directly by the possible weighting of utilities in risky situations. In the probanegative outcomes and their respective subjective utbility estimation task in both experiments, participants ilities.
were not explicitly gambling; they were merely indicat-
GENERAL DISCUSSION
ing interpretive estimates of probabilities of winning and losing money for vague linguistic phrases. These We have found that positive affect can produce both estimates tended to exhibit the familiar cognitive effect relative risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior in indi-of being somewhat inflated for low probabilities and viduals at the same time that they are experiencing a somewhat depressed for higher probabilities, when the feeling of relative optimism about the likelihoods asso-probabilities were associated with a risky gambling ciated with the choice outcomes. Although these results context as opposed to a riskless one. Positive affect seem at first to be somewhat contradictory, the focus tends to increase the tendency to interpret vaguely posof the present studies allows us to explain our results itive probability phrases as more positive, but does not in terms of a single processing model. We suggest that influence interpretation of negative phrases as much. a critical point of concern is the distinction between This differential treatment of probabilities associated the estimation process for event probabilities associ-with good and bad outcomes is consistent with extenated with ''good'' and ''bad'' outcomes and the actual sions of SEU-type models recently proposed by Hogarth choice process wherein the utilities and the weightings and Einhorn (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman of the ''good'' and ''bad'' outcomes are obtained. (1992) . In Experiment 1 we found a feeling of optimism Although our experiments were not designed to test in our affect participants that was reflected by the sigany specific choice model, our ''cautious optimism'' re-nificant enhancement of their subjective estimates of sults pose some interesting problems for simple bilin-the probability of winning relative to losing. Control ear models like SEU theory or Kahneman and Tver-participants did not show this enhanced estimation efsky's (1979) early version of prospect theory. The gen-fect. However, positive affect did not lead these people eral effect of positive mood on people's betting is to to act on their inflated estimates, and thus it is difficult decrease their willingness to bet in situations where to interpret the increase as ''bias.'' Such an increase potential losses are great. At the same time, their ini-would not necessarily be dangerous, if it does not imtial subjective estimates of the likelihoods of winning pact behavior.
We did not find this optimism to the same extent in appear to be generally increased by the affective state, Experiment 2. There was actually a strong bias in our pants were doing something far less risky-deciding on a gambling strategy to accumulate points to win control participants that we did not find in Experiment prizes rather than avoid loss of credit hours. Hence, 1 for being somewhat pessimistic-giving greater overlosses, even small ones, were salient to Experiment 1 all estimates to the probabilities of losing rather than participants in every bet, which resulted in risk-averse winning. One possible explanation for this initially behavior across gambles. In Experiment 2, in which stronger negative bias is that the betting and estimathe danger of potential loss, though certainly present, tion tasks were more closely tied together in Experiwas less impactful, changes in disutilities of losses for ment 2 than in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 the positive-affect participants would be somewhat estimation task was more likely to be seen as a differsmaller, and for some gambles even nonexistent, leadent task that used different gambles, as well as phrases ing as it did for affect participants to more risk-seeking as probabilities rather than numbers. In Experiment 2, behavior for gambles with small amounts to lose than however, the same gambles with the same probability would normally be expected. This may explain why representations were used in both tasks and thus it is there were, in Experiment 2, low P W /P L gambles on likely that participants could not estimate the phrases which affect participants actually bet more than did without their gambling biases having some influence.
controls, but in Experiment 1 there were not. Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that optiWith respect to the betting task, there is consistent mism in the absolute sense of an individual evaluating evidence in the decision-making literature (e.g., Lich-P W phrases greater than P L phrases was not found for tenstein & Slovic, 1971 ) that, in general, individuals our positive affect participants in Experiment 2. Hownormally follow a rule in which they focus on probabiliever, a relative optimism was found, in that affect partities in making risky choices. Our control participants cipants overcame the strong negative bias shown by in both experiments exhibited choice behavior that was controls and did evaluate the P W and P L phrases about consistent with this rule. It is possible that most people, the same. Thus, we argue that optimism in a relative like our control participants, typically follow a decision sense was still present for our affect participants but rule that says ''don't be too reckless or too risk-seeking; it was reduced in Experiment 2 in an absolute sense avoid alternatives with large or moderate probability when the estimation task was more closely tied to the of loss, even if the amount to lose is relatively moderate betting task.
or small.'' In our studies, such an overt strategy or rule Thus, we explain the cautious optimist as one who, of betting mainly on gambles with low probability of because of some natural or temporarily induced posi-loss and moderate to high probability of small gains is tive feeling state, expresses a greater likelihood ratio congruent with the participants' correctly recognizing of good-to-bad probabilities than might otherwise be that, on average across the set of gambles, they should expected when asked to interpret probabilities, but who experience a greater number of gains than losses. is also distinctly aware of his or her potential loss and Positive affect, however, appeared to effect a switch does not lose sight of its potential impact. In fact, this from this decision rule which involves focusing on probperson differentially reevaluates the disutilities of po-abilities in the gambles, to one of focusing on the actual tential losses relatively more than potential gains, and gamble outcomes, and in particular to one involving the sees these as more threatening than do control partici-avoidance of meaningful potential losses. This would pants-so much so that he or she exhibits a greater be compatible with the earlier findings that potential avoidance of losses than would normally otherwise be losses seem worse to people in positive-affect conditions observed. The betting task of Experiment 1, which in- (Isen et al., 1988) leading to choice of a strategy or volved the participants' gambling for their credit hour decision rule consistent with avoiding such losses. It for participating in the experiment, was this kind of a has, in fact, been suggested in the affect literature that potential ''real'' loss situation. Two observations sup-positive affect participants may consciously adapt their port this conclusion: (1) Some individuals deliberated behavior to maintain this positive transient state (Misover whether or not to actually participate and risk chel et al. 1976; Isen & Simmonds, 1978; , the loss of their credit hour, with four deciding not to 1988; Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988) . Such adapted participate; and (2) very few people consistently dou-behavior would be equivalent in Tversky and Kahnebled or tripled the outcomes in even the ''low risk '' bets, man's (1992) prospect theory sense to doing what is an observation of conservatism in betting strategy that necessary to maintain a positive position above their one would not expect to find if participants felt that reference point. If this is correct, our results suggest they really had nothing to lose.
that affect maintenance may be more readily accomWe suggest that this perception of potential for a real plished by employing a strategy where any losses, especially large ones, are avoided. loss was less salient in Experiment 2 where partici-Several researchers have proposed models that sug-not change that fundamental process is encouraging.
These kinds of findings remind us once again that posigest that positive affect should lead to more thoughts tive affect does not render people irrational or unconabout positive outcomes, especially in a positive context trolled or blindly subject to optimistic biases. Rather, (Bower, 1981; Kahn & Isen, 1993) .
its impact is to make people think more about the The optimism shown by affect participants in our estithings that are important to them, and to believe so as mation task is consistent with these models, but their to protect those things, while at the same time enjoying betting behavior, while not inconsistent with it, rewhat is safe and enjoyable in their surroundings. quires further interpretation. That is, if positive affect cues positive memories and thoughts and promotes
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
elaboration of positive material, why doesn't this result in positive-affect participants expecting better outWhy should people who are more optimistic about a comes as well as better probabilities? risky decision situation, be more conservative in their The reason has to do, in part, with the influence (or, actual gambling? The answer may be that while feelrather the lack of influence) of positive affect on negaings of optimism produced by positive affect may bias tive material. Several studies have indicated that posijudgments of the likelihoods of events in a positive way tive affect does not result in elaboration of negative (Mayer et al., 1992) , these likelihoods may become less material and does not influence cognitive processes important or relevant to positive affect individuals. about negative material in a parallel way to the influThis may be because their decision rule for making ence it has on positive or neutral material (e.g., Isen et risky choices changes to focusing on avoiding potential al., 1985; Isen et al., 1992) . Moreover these and other losses more than on anything else. It is a matter of studies also show, repeatedly, that positive affect does what seems important to people. not simply bias or improve all judgments, even negative In summary, the results presented here, together material (e.g., Isen & Shalker, 1982) . That is, negative with those reported elsewhere, are producing a more possibilities do not seem less harmful just because one complete picture of the role that positive affect plays is feeling happy. Thus, the evaluation of negative mate-in thinking and decision-making. They also draw attenrial is not biased upward by positive affect, and, in fact, tion to the importance of processes such as the separawe know that negative outcomes, once they are focused tion of relative gains and losses, probability estimation, upon, actually seem worse to people in positive affect and utility assessment, and how these component prostates.
cesses are integrated with one another in decisionThus, to understand why people do not actually making under risk and uncertainty. The results of the choose the gambles to the same extent that they regard present studies suggest another mechanism underlytheir probabilities as more favorable, one needs to con-ing the impact of affect and provide further evidence sider people's estimates of how the different outcomes for the importance of the study of affect and emotions will likely feel, one needs to recognize that positive in general on decision-making under risk. affect will not simply blind people to potential negative situations, and one needs to consider the data indicat-
